Thefinal report在11月12日发布的迈阿密桥梁崩溃上，添加了有关该项目团队的众多失败导致悲剧的新细节，尤其是那些由Figg Bridge工程师和Louis Berger Group犯下的。

Also, NTSB Vice Chairman Bruce Landsberg adds to the agency’s assessment with a scathing statement that notes, in part: “The bridge was not properly designed, and there was no qualified oversight on that design. When the inevitable began to happen—a creeping, catastrophic material failure, nobody did anything, despite what NTSB Chairman Sumwalt accurately described as the ‘bridge screaming at everyone that it was failing.’ Why?” (Readers can view Landsberg’s full statement这里）

Both FIGG and Louis Berger Group, now part of WSP, declined further comment.

The NTSB’s probable cause statement remains unchanged from its Oct. 22 announcement, with the agency citing “load and capacity calculation errors made by FIGG Bridge Engineers, Inc. in its design of the main span truss member 11/12 nodal region and connection to the bridge deck,” along with an “inadequate peer review performed by Louis Berger” and “the failure of the FIGG engineer of record to identify the significance of the structural cracking observed in this node before the collapse.”

该机构在没有命名他的情况下详细介绍了记录工程师丹尼·佩特（Denney Pate）的无所作为（经常被称为“ figg eor”），而其他人则与Figg一再强调承包商MCM和其他项目团队成员，这是广泛的。在未完成的结构上发生的破裂没有构成安全危害。

On March 13, for instance, just two days before the March 15 collapse, a FIGG design manager twice told MCM that the cracking did not constitute a hazard, stating first, “We do not see this as a safety issue.” Later that same day, the design manager reiterated: “Again, we have evaluated this further and confirmed that this is not a safety issue.”

此外，在崩溃的早晨，帕特（Pate）领导了项目团队成员（包括FDOT，佛罗里达国际大学，MCM和建筑检查公司Bolton，Perez and Associates）的演讲，他指出“与观察到的相对于所观察到的没有安全的问题裂缝和小垃圾。”

________________________________________________

Full Text of the Final NTSB Miami Bridge Collapse Report

________________________________________________

That statement to the project team came shortly after Pate and another FIGG employee “went onto the main span and viewed the cracks at the member 11/12 nodal region,” where the collapse would occur later that day.

根据NTSB的说法，“ Figg员工（不是EOR）拍摄了七张裂缝的照片。Figg EOR在凌晨9:00之前，期间或之后没有查看这些照片。”

另外,之前该机构报道,“presentation, MCM provided site inspection photographs to the FIGG EOR, and he stated during the meeting that ‘the cracks look more significant in person than on the photographs.’”

引用的设计和同行评审错误

该桥梁项目将跨越多条交通车道，并将佛罗里达国际大学校园与邻近社区联系起来。

According to NTSB, FIGG’s unique design, a concrete truss, “led to the circumstances that accounted for the collapse of the pedestrian bridge,” including an underestimation of “the demand (loads imposed on structural members) that would be acting on the nodal area (11/12),” where the bridge failed. The agency calculated that “the demand for the node was nearly twice what the design team had calculated.”

Further, FIGG’s use of “incorrect loads and load factors in its calculations” led to an overestimation of capacity which “resulted in a node that lacked the capacity to resist the shear force pushing the node to the end of the bridge.”

该机构指出，它无法从FIGG的计划中确定该公司如何计算容量和需求估计。结果，研究人员使用AASHTO指南来确定自己的这些估计。

The Louis Berger Group's partial peer review failed to catch these alleged design errors. The NTSB found that though Berger has admitted to performing a limited peer review of the bridge’s design, FIGG never authorized anything less than a full review.

报告说：“该公司进行的审查没有评估与桥梁甲板和冠层相连的桥梁的节点，也没有考虑涉及的桥梁建设的多个阶段。”

Originally, FIGG had planned on another of its offices performing the peer review, but that was not allowed by FDOT regulations.

Instead, in August 2016, FIGG negotiated with Louis Berger to perform this work. The engineer cut Berger’s fee from the $110,000 it had bid to $61,000, with FIGG informing Berger that nevertheless “the original scope of work remained unchanged,” NTSB reported.

In response to the fee cut, “Louis Berger reduced its timeframe for the project from 10 weeks to 7 weeks, to meet FIGG’s requirements.”

In a post-collapse interview, Berger's peer-review engineer told NTSB: “In the beginning, I suggested to do this kind of analysis, to analyze the connections. I'm talking about the nodes, or the joints to analyze the connections. However, the budget and time to do this actually was not agreed upon with the designer.”

In his statement, Landsberg, the NTSB vice chairman, comments: “The reason given (by Berger) was there wasn’t enough money in the project to cover their efforts. That’s both disingenuous and unconscionable. It also was in violation of FDOT’s requirement that there be an independent second set of eyes to review everything – not just what was economically convenient.”

Fix Attempt Proves Fatal

Figg对MCM和Bolton提交的破解照片的评论最终导致了解决该问题的尝试。

3月13日，NTSB报道说，FIGG官员向MCM建议一项计划，以“恢复成员11中的临时PT杆，以将其恢复到先前的状态，当时MCM知道裂缝较小。”

FIGG decided on that course of action based on the fact that cracking had worsened after crews had de-tensioned the temporary PT rods in members 2 and 11.

福格的早晨崩溃,发布了plan to retension member 11—which NTSB calls a “a rushed change order for construction”—to FDOT, FIU, MCM, and Bolton, Perez. The post-tensioning inspection contractor, The Corradino Group, was only notified of the plan that same morning, but was not onsite when the work was performed and the collapse occurred.

The NTSB found that no independent peer review was ever performed of FIGG’s plan to fix the cracking as it should have been, since it was not originally included as part of the engineer’s plans.

According to NTSB, “Post-collapse, the FIGG EOR stated that the retensioning of this truss member would bring the main span back to its ‘pre-existing condition’—of a previous stage. According to FIGG, this decision was based on judgment that returning the main span to its preexisting condition was not a change to the FIGG design and was the right thing to do.”

The NTSB report rejects the notion of any attempted fix resulting in returning the structure to its pre-existing condition.

“The retensioning of member 11 on March 15 was the final stressing force that resulted in the failure of the member 11/12 nodal region. The FIGG design did not show the restressing of member 11, nor would the restressing have returned the node to its pre-cracking condition.

NTSB补充说：“因此，NTSB得出的结论是，对成员11的恢复是对构成FIGG设计更改的负载的操纵，并且在实施之前，应已独立对P.E.签名和签名和密封，” NTSB补充说。

When the member 11/12 nodal region failed, at approximately 1:47 pm on March 15, 2018, the structure came crashing down in seconds, killing one project worker and five people stranded in vehicles underneath the unfinished bridge.

Prediction: Landmark Case Study

In his statement, Vice Chairman Landsberg notes the exceptional nature of the FIU bridge collapse by stating that “Engineering schools will use this as a landmark case study for years – and they should.”

Landsberg继续谴责似乎感染了桥梁团队所有成员的“团体思维”，并指出：“看来（这种）心态在这里，每个组织中都在发挥作用：Figg，LB，MCM…，Bolton Perez。..，FDOT，最后是佛罗里达国际大学。

“It also appears that every organization absolved themselves of responsibility by rationalizing that if the EOR says it’s OK, it must be OK, and if anything bad happens – it’s on him,” he continued. “That is not the intent of peer review or safety oversight, and certainly fails the system of checks and balances in place to prevent catastrophes like these.”

Again, readers can view the full report这里, and Landsberg’s full statement这里.