国家运输安全委员会10月8日发布了与FIU桥梁崩溃有关的文件,这引发了问题,但没有提供有关为什么部分建筑结构突然在2018年3月15日突然坠毁在地面上的原因,杀死了六人。关于致命崩溃原因的最后一个官方消息必须等待该机构的最终报告,该报告定于10月22日发布。

However, notable among the Oct. 8 release of interview transcripts, newly released photos and dozens of other items are two separate reports submitted by the project’s lead contractor, MCM, and the bridge’s design engineer, FIGG Bridge Engineers. The respective “party submission” reports, provided to NTSB as part of the agency’s investigatory process, offer dueling accounts, with each pointing responsibility at the other party.

FIGG asserts that contractors failed to communicate specifics of cracking on the bridge structure.

For example, FIGG asserts that contractors failed to communicate specifics of cracking on the bridge structure. MCM’s report to NTSB counters that argument with details of emails and other communications to FIGG—and other project team members—noting the cracking’s severity.

在10月8日的新闻稿中,FIGG吹捧了Wiss,Janney,Elstner Associates(WJE)(雇用Figg)得出的结论,这是因为“承包商未能符合最终的桥梁设计计划,并遵守国家佛罗里达州建设要求。”

The Tallahassee, Fla.-based bridge engineer specified that the “probable cause,” based upon WJE’s findings, was that “the construction joint at the north end of the main span between the truss members and the bridge deck was not roughened as required.”

Figg补充说:“承包商的质量控制人员或根据与FIU合同的合同,未注意到这种未能满足建筑规范要求的情况。”

Critically, FIGG asserts that MCM and other firms on site had become aware of changes in the cracks that were occurring on the bridge in the days preceding the collapse, but failed to communicate these developments to FIGG personnel.

“没有迹象表明MCM,BPA(Bolton,Perez&Associates)或其他项目参与者在此期间现场积极观察到裂纹表示对SW 8th Street上跨越SPAN的安全性表示关注或建议这条路should be closed until the situation was resolved,” FIGG’s report states.


MCM提交有争议的帐户

Contacted by ENR, MCM did not offer a further statement but instead pointed to its own submission to the NTSB, which rebuts FIGG’s version of events with extensive details of its communications to the bridge designer.

例如,在崩溃之前的几天,MCM报告了电子邮件将破解的新照片发送给FIGG,以及此消息:“按照我们以前的有关著名破解的电子邮件,以及FIGG在现场见证的一部分,作为运动/勃起支持的一部分,请找到图片,描绘了跨度1和11的跨度1勃起和/或破坏跨度2和11的照片。

MCM电子邮件继续说:“这是我们的意见,其中一些裂缝相当大和/或关注;因此,请尽可能及时审查和评论,并建议是否需要采取必要的措施来补救或立即解决这些问题。”

MCM进一步向NTSB断言,Figg的设计经理Dwight Dempsey向承包商传达了工程师“没有将其视为安全问题”。


会议记录

FDOT于5月份发布的崩溃的早晨在现场举行的一场figg领导的会议的会议记录,支持MCM的论点是,桥梁的设计师从裂缝中看到了“没有安全的问题”。记录3月15日会议showed, for example, that a slide from FIGG’s presentation stated: “After about an hour of review and evaluation, FIGG had conducted sufficient supplemental/independent computations to conclude that there is not any concern with safety of the span suspended over the road.”

尽管如此,Figg援引WJE的分析,认为责备是建筑承包商完全取决于:“与不完整的事故更新相反,佛罗里达国际大学的大学城市行人桥的设计既不是一个临近的原因,也不是促成原因的原因在建筑事故中。但是,如果各方建造桥梁,检查建筑物或将桥梁移至位置,则无法遵守(计划,规格和要求),那么即使是安全的设计也将受到损害。透明

NTSB计划在悲剧中发布其关于悲剧可能原因的报告公开会议to be held at 9:30 a.m. on Oct. 22. The meeting will be available via live webcast.